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Job Search Periods for Welfare Applicants:  
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment†
By Jonneke Bolhaar, Nadine Ketel, and Bas van der Klaauw*
We combine a randomized experiment with administrative data to 
study the effects of mandatory job search periods in the Dutch wel-
fare system. Job search periods postpone the first welfare benefits 
payment and encourage applicants to start searching for jobs 
actively. Job search periods substantially reduce benefits take up. 
The decline in benefits receipt is permanent, but fully compensated 
by increased earnings because of higher reemployment rates. We do 
not find detectable effects on health and crime outcomes, nor do we 
observe income declines for more vulnerable applicants. Our results 
suggest that job search periods are an effective instrument for target-
ing benefits to welfare applicants. (JEL C93, I38, J31, J64)
This paper evaluates job search periods that aim to reduce moral hazard prob-lems in the welfare benefits system. A job search period is a mandatory waiting 
period of at most four weeks in which an applicant is encouraged to actively search 
for work. During the job search period, the application is put on hold and eligibil-
ity for welfare benefits is checked after the job search period. When an applicant 
is considered eligible, benefits are paid retrospectively from the moment of initial 
application (so before the job search period was imposed).
A job search period can affect labor market outcomes in several ways. First, a job 
search period makes the application process for welfare benefits more complex and 
increases the costs of applying.1 After the job search period, applicants have to pay 
a second visit to the welfare office to confirm their application for welfare benefits. 
This can decrease the likelihood to receive benefits even in absence of job find-
ing. Second, the job search requirement can increase the likelihood of  finding a job 
1 Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) considers the complexity of the application process for benefits as an alternative 
policy instrument to reduce moral hazard problems. Currie and Grogger (2001) and Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 
(2003) attribute the incomplete take-up of the food stamp program and WIC program to application costs, which 
are particularly important for vulnerable groups. 
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and thereby reduce welfare benefits receipt. During the job search period workers 
can themselves decide which jobs to apply to, but when collecting welfare benefits 
workers should accept all jobs offered to them. Black et al. (2003) suggest that 
announcing obligations stimulates benefits recipients to find work. Both mecha-
nisms serve as a self-selection or self-screening device (Parsons 1991), but affect 
a different part of the population of applicants. An increase in job finding reduces 
take up of applicants with relatively good labor market prospects, while increased 
complexity discourages applicants that do not find a job but cannot deal with the 
complexity of the application process.
There is a limited literature linking the take-up of benefits to the entry require-
ments of the program (Currie 2006).2 For example, Parsons (1991) and de Jong, 
Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) show that more stringent entry require-
ments for disability insurance induce self-selection among applicants. Welfare dif-
fers substantially from disability insurance; it is a safety net covering individuals 
who have very low other income. In the United States, welfare is mostly used to sup-
port single-parent households. In European countries, it also supports unemployed 
workers, who are no longer entitled to unemployment insurance. The population 
of welfare benefits recipients contains workers with limitations, long-term unem-
ployed workers, and workers with low skills. Therefore, it is important to consider 
heterogeneous effects and to focus on various sources of income, both for recipients 
and non-recipients of the benefits.3
To evaluate job search periods we conducted a randomized experiment from 
April 2012 to March 2013, incorporating the full population of welfare applicants 
with a potential to work in Amsterdam. We combine various data sources to con-
struct a detailed administrative dataset describing the participants in the experiment. 
This allows us to look at the implications of a job search period on welfare benefits 
receipt and study the effect on alternative sources of income. In addition, we con-
sider engagement in criminal activities and health status, which are associated to 
negative externalities but have to our knowledge not been studied before in the con-
text of increased application costs for benefits programs.
The setup of our randomized experiment is similar to an encouragement design 
(Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2008), but we impose a stronger encouragement 
than usually. We randomize treatments over caseworkers, who receive the instruction 
to apply one particular treatment, a default option, to all their new clients in a given 
period. In case the default option is really not appropriate, caseworkers are allowed 
to deviate but should provide a motivation. The possibility to deviate increases sup-
port for the experiment among caseworkers. The design exploits the random assign-
ment of applicants to caseworkers within each local welfare office.4 Our empirical 
2 Bhargava and Manoli (2015) provides empirical evidence that the take-up of the earned income tax credit 
increases after explaining the application procedure, and Krueger (1990) argues that a waiting period reduces par-
ticipation in a disability insurance program. Alatas et al. (2016) finds that adding a small application cost substan-
tially improves targeting through self selection in Indonesia’s Conditional Cash Transfer program. 
3 Observing income of non-recipients is important when studying take-up decisions of welfare benefits (Hotz, 
Mullin, and Scholz 2002; Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes 2006). 
4 Within a local office all caseworkers have the same target concerning exit to work. The random assignment 
of applicants to caseworkers allows the welfare agency to benchmark caseworkers and ensures that all caseworkers 
have the same fair chance to meet the target. 
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strategy is similar to Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), who exploit variation 
in examiners’ allowance rates as an instrument for disability benefit receipt, using 
that applicants are randomly assigned to disability examiners.5 Crépon et al. (2013)
use an encouragement design to evaluate active labor market programs in France, 
and Sherman, and Berk (1984) use a similar design to study the effects of police 
responses to domestic violence calls. Compared to these studies, the variation that 
we exploit is somewhat higher. Our study has a compliance rate to the random treat-
ment assignment of 46 percent compared to 35 percent in Crépon et al. (2013), 
while Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) exploit a natural variation of 23 percent.6
Imposing a job search period reduces the likelihood to receive welfare benefits 
by 20 percentage points. The effect is significant up to six months after registration, 
and during these months total welfare benefits payments are about 25 percent lower. 
There is no spillover to other benefits schemes and the lower income from wel-
fare benefits is fully compensated (108 percent) by higher earnings.7 A job search 
period does not increase the likelihood to engage in criminal activities and does not 
increase individual health-care expenditures. A job search period is most effective 
for the least vulnerable applicants, for this group benefits receipt decreases with 86 
percent. The lack of negative side effects of a job search period also holds for the 
most vulnerable applicants. Our preferred conclusion is, therefore, that increased 
job finding is the main mechanism through which job search periods affect individ-
ual outcomes. Finally, we find that the estimated local average treatment effect is 
not sensitive to changes in the sample and the group of compliers. This implies that 
caseworkers do not succeed in targeting job search periods to those applicants for 
which they are most effective.
Currently, there is a tendency among policy makers in many countries to restrict 
access to benefits schemes and to be stricter on job search requirements. Lachowska, 
Meral, and Woodbury (2016) and McVicar (2008) show the importance of job search 
requirements for job finding. The costs of imposing job search periods are very low 
and the effects are larger than other policies targeted toward welfare recipients and 
disadvantaged unemployed workers. For example, the Canadian self-sufficiency 
project offers an earnings subsidy for three years to welfare recipients who find 
work within 12 months. Card and Hyslop (2005) find that after 18 months the effect 
on employment is 14 percentage points, which reduces afterward and fades away 
after the subsidy ends. Van der Klaauw and van Ours (2013) study financial incen-
tives for welfare recipients in Rotterdam and estimate that a re-employment bonus 
of about 2,000 euros increases the job finding rate by about 2 percentage points, 
while a punitive benefits reduction has an effect of about 5 percentage points. Bitler, 
Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006) show that Connecticut’s job first program, which 
reduces lifetime welfare benefits receipt to 21 months and substantially reduces the 
5 We cannot exploit the natural variation per caseworker, such as Autor et al. (2017) or Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand (2013), because caseworkers also give guidance to returning applicants after an unsuccessful job search 
period. 
6 The compliance rate in Sherman and Berk (1984) is unclear. Of the cases handed in by police officers, com-
pliance is around 80 percent, but not all police officers handed in (all) cases. 
7 The full monetary compensation does not necessarily imply that individual welfare increases. When sub-
stituting earnings for benefits individuals lose leisure, but no longer have to make job search costs and adhere to 
requirements of the welfare agency. 
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marginal tax rate, has an earnings effect between  −US$300 and $500 with a mean 
of $82. Markussen and Røed (2016) consider an extensive activation program com-
bined with income support for potential welfare recipients and find that after 4 years 
participation increases employment rates by 18 percentage points. Because the 
employment concerns small, poorly paid jobs, income effects are at most modest. 
Black et al. (2003) find that an activation program targeted toward disadvantaged 
unemployment insurance benefits recipients in Kentucky reduces benefits receipts 
by 2.2 weeks and increases earnings by about $1,050. The threat effect is the main 
explanation for the effect on job finding. Our results emphasize the importance of 
factors that are not generally considered as the main incentives for the take-up of 
benefits. In particular, we show that the job search period, which entails no direct 
financial incentives, achieves an impact that is at least comparable to costly activa-
tion programs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I provides details 
about the Dutch benefit system, explains the experimental design and shows compli-
ance rates. Section II describes the data and provides evidence on the random assign-
ment. In Section III, we discuss the empirical strategy and identification. Section IV 
presents the main results, while Section V investigates whether a job search period 
has a negative effect on specific subgroups. Section VI discusses the generalizability 
of our results by interpreting the estimated local average treatment effect. Section 
VII concludes.
I. Setting and Experimental Design
A. Welfare in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, welfare serves as a safety net and provides a minimum income 
to households with no or not enough means of living. Welfare benefits are means 
tested (on both income and wealth) and the benefits level depends on the composi-
tion of the household. Rules about eligibility and the level of benefits are determined 
nationwide, but the responsibility for the implementation is at the municipality level. 
The regular benefits range from 70 percent of the minimum wage for a single-person 
household to 100 percent for a couple with children.8 During our observation period, 
the national net minimum wage was about 1,200 euros per month. Municipalities 
can give additional benefits on top of the regular benefits; Amsterdam pays a hous-
ing allowance of 133 euro per month. Furthermore, all Dutch households with low 
income are entitled to subsidies for housing, health insurance, and children.9 Unlike 
in the United States, there is no maximum to the time period that a household can 
receive welfare benefits (or subsidies). If a welfare recipient finds part-time employ-
ment or has part-time employment with earnings below the welfare benefits level, 
earnings have a marginal tax rate of 100 percent. For the health insurance and hous-
ing subsidies other marginal tax rates apply (child subsidies are not income related).
8 Table A1 in the Appendix provides the exact benefits levels at the time of the experiment. 
9 The maximum monthly amounts of these subsidies are 309 euro (for housing subsidies), 70 euro 
(health insurance subsidies), and per child 84 euro (child subsidies). 
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Applicants for welfare benefits have to show extensive proof of their (past) 
income, bank accounts, housing etc. Welfare recipients have to comply with 
job search requirements, and are obliged to accept all jobs, irrespective of the match 
with their education or work experience. These obligations are set by the national 
government, but the municipality has discretion in deciding about how welfare 
recipients are supported in their job search.
B. Job Search Period
Our experiment focuses on the job search period, a policy that was introduced 
by the welfare agency in 2011. A job search period postpones the application for 
welfare benefits at most four weeks, during which the individual has to actively 
search for work. The application for benefits will only be activated if the applicant 
returns to the welfare agency after the job search period. If the welfare application is 
activated and processed, the applicant will (retrospectively) receive benefits starting 
at the date of the initial registration. A job search period thus only delays the first 
payment of benefits; it does not reduce the amount of benefits that an individual is 
entitled to.10 Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the application process 
for welfare benefits, including the job search period. Irrespective of the job search 
period, the welfare application needs to be processed within eight weeks after the 
day of registration.11
The decision to apply a job search period is made during the intake meeting and, 
before the experiment, was left to the caseworkers’ discretion. However, job search 
periods should not be applied if an applicant has severe financial problems or can 
prove that she has been very active in applying for jobs prior to registration at the 
welfare agency. An applicant cannot refuse a job search period. When imposing a 
job search period, the caseworker specifies a minimum number of job applications 
that the applicant should make within the job search period. The caseworker stresses 
that during the job search period the applicant can still choose which jobs to apply 
to, but as soon as the applicant starts receiving welfare benefits it is mandatory to 
accept all jobs. If the applicant returns from a job search period, the caseworker 
generally checks whether the applicant has complied with the job search require-
ment, and can impose a sanction if this is not the case. This sanction is a 30 percent 
reduction in benefits for the duration of one month. In practice, these sanctions are 
almost never applied.
C. Setting of the Experiment
Our experiment took place in Amsterdam. In January 2012, 6.4 percent of the 
population between 20 and 65 years old received welfare benefits in Amsterdam 
10 Applicants who find employment during a job search period can file a request for receiving welfare benefits 
for the period between the date of registration and the starting date of new employment. This requires completing 
the application process and is not actively promoted by the welfare agency. Most individuals that find a job during 
the job search period do not use this possibility. 
11 In our data, approved applicants without a job search period receive their first benefits payment, on average, 
38 days after registration. A job search period delays this first payment to, on average, 54 days after registration. 
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(i.e., 34,550 individuals) compared to 3.1 percent in the Netherlands. During 2012, 
the inflow into welfare in Amsterdam consisted of 11,706 individuals, while in the 
same year 8,944 individuals stopped receiving benefits. The larger inflow is a direct 
result of the second economic downturn after the financial crisis.12
Welfare recipients in Amsterdam are divided over five welfare offices. Individuals 
have to apply for benefits at the local welfare office in their city district. Applicants 
are classified in one of four classes, depending on their labor market prospects. The 
type and intensity of guidance given to the applicant and the required job search 
effort varies over these classes. The class is determined through a computerized 
program that profiles all workers based on their characteristics. These characteristics 
include, among others, work history, age, education, language and computer skills, 
recent detention, and psychological problems.
Job search periods are only applied to applicants in the highest class (class four), 
which is the class of applicants that should be able to find regular employment within 
six months. The sample for our experiment consists of individuals in class four that 
applied for welfare benefits in Amsterdam between April 2012 and March 2013.13 
In addition, we restrict the experiment to individuals that are at least 27 years old, as 
12 Figure B1 in the Appendix shows GDP growth for the Netherlands and inflow and outflow into welfare ben-
efits in Amsterdam from 2008 until 2014. 
13 Figure B2 in the Appendix plots the inflow per class between 2012 and 2014, also indicating the start and 
end of the experimental period. The inflow per class is stable over time, and there are no significant changes at the 
beginning and the end of the experiment. 
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different rules apply to welfare recipients under age 27. Approximately 40 percent 
of the inflow are classified as class four.14
D. Experimental Design
We conducted a randomized experiment in which we manipulate the assignment 
of job search periods.15 Applicants are not informed about the experiment to prevent 
that this knowledge would influence their behavior. Instead of randomizing the treat-
ments over individuals, we randomize the treatments over caseworkers. Caseworkers 
receive the instruction to apply one particular treatment to all their new clients 
during a three-month period. We call this particular treatment their default option, 
which makes our design similar to an encouragement design (Duflo, Glennerster, 
and Kremer 2008). We instruct caseworkers to deviate from the default option only 
in cases where the default option is really not appropriate. This helped to make the 
experiment more acceptable for caseworkers. Our design exploits that within local 
offices welfare applicants are randomly allocated to caseworkers. Welfare applicants 
are matched to the caseworker with the lowest caseload.
There are three different default options:
 •  Never: never impose a job search period.
 •  Always: always impose a job search period if the financial situation of the 
individual allows for it.
 •  Normal: the decision to impose a job search period is left to the discretion of 
the caseworker.
The default option “normal” shows what the caseworkers decide in absence of the 
experiment, which allows us to study targeting by caseworkers. The experimen-
tal period is divided into four periods of three months. Each period the caseworkers 
receive a new default option that they have to apply to all new applicants assigned to 
them in this period. This allows us to control for business cycle effects. The random-
ization of default options over caseworkers took place at the level of the welfare office.
In two local offices (South-East and South-West) the application process is con-
ducted by another team of caseworkers than the team that assists in job finding 
when actually collecting benefits. At these local offices, the default options were 
equally randomized over the periods and the caseworkers, with the restriction that 
each caseworker gets each default option at least once. At the other local offices 
(West, Center-East, North), the application process is done by the same casework-
ers who also assist in job finding. Here, we restricted the randomization such that 
(i) a caseworker could have the default options “always” and “never” at most once, 
(ii) each period all default options were present at all local offices, and  (iii) over 
14 Table A2 in the Appendix presents the background characteristics of the applicants in the four different 
classes, based on the applications between January 2012 and end of April 2014. Applicants in class four have more 
favorable characteristics, they are slightly younger, higher educated, and less likely to have psychological or phys-
ical problems. However, the magnitude of these differences is not very large. 
15 The original research design, including a power analysis, can be found at http://personal.vu.nl/b.vander.
klaauw/ResearchProposalDWI2012.pdf. 
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all local offices about 50 percent of all applicants were treated under “normal” and 
25 percent under “always” and “never.” Our data do not show evidence that the dif-
ferent randomization plans for the two groups of local offices affect the rate at which 
job search periods are applied under each default option.
Before the start of the experiment we organized meetings with all caseworkers 
to inform them about the experiment. At the start of every three-month period, each 
caseworker was instructed individually about her new default option. Caseworkers 
were asked to fill in a form about the applicant at each intake meeting. The forms 
were personalized for each caseworker and had the period-specific default option 
printed on the form. During the experiment, we visited the local welfare offices 
almost weekly to answer questions from caseworkers, pick up forms, and to visit 
caseworkers that had not filled in the forms for new applicants or deviated substan-
tially from their given default option.16
E. Compliance Rates
Figure 2 shows the fraction of job search periods applied per default option 
during the experimental period.17 The distinction between the three default options 
is most pronounced at the start of the experiment. The percentage of job search 
periods given under the default “always” remained relatively stable over time, 
while it increased for the other two default options. During the experiment, we 
 communicated with 112 caseworkers. Some caseworkers left, and new caseworkers 
16 The forms are filled in for 72 percent of the observations. Given that (almost) all information is also available 
through the administrative records (for the full sample), we do not use the forms for our main empirical analysis. 
For the experiment, the forms were very useful as the period-specific default option was printed on them and it gave 
us a reason to regularly check caseworkers. 
17 Figure 2 reports average compliance rates for all caseworkers. In Section VI, we discuss the variability of 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Applicants That Are Given a Job Search Period by Default Option, over Time
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entered the  organization and took over their caseload. Furthermore a few times the 
caseload of a sick caseworker was taken over by a colleague. Such cases are associ-
ated with a larger noncompliance in both the default options “always” and “never.” 
On average, during the experimental period, caseworkers with the default option 
“never” imposed a job search period to 9 percent of the applicants, caseworkers with 
default option “always” applied a job search period to 55 percent of the applicants, 




Our analysis employs data from three different sources, that are linked using 
unique identifiers for each individual. The welfare agency of Amsterdam provides 
administrative information on the date of registration at the welfare office, date of 
application for welfare, start and end date of collecting welfare benefits, whether a 
job search period is applied and the identity of the caseworker that conducted the 
intake meeting. The individual characteristics of applicants that are registered in 
these data are date of birth, gender, household composition, and highest level of 
education. Furthermore, we observe the exact benefits payments. Second, we use 
data from the national social insurance administration to observe weekly informa-
tion for each individual on the amount of income from employment, hours worked, 
and income from other benefit schemes.18 We have this information for all partic-
ipants in the experiment from January 2008 until October 2013. The retrospective 
nature of the data allows us to construct labor market histories for all individuals. 
Third, we link the data to individual records of all Dutch citizens kept by Statistics 
Netherlands. This contains individual-level information on criminal activities and 
health expenditures. In addition, it ensures access to labor market information (at a 
monthly level) up to December 2014, allowing us to look at longer term outcomes. 
The data from both Statistics Netherlands and from the national social insurance 
administration cover the full population of the Netherlands, such that the experiment 
sample is matched without attrition.
B. Sample
Based on inflow in previous years we expected 2,500 individuals to participate in 
the experiment. Our initial power calculation was based on this inflow number. Our 
final sample consists of 2,860 welfare applications (2,709 unique individuals).19
Thirty-eight welfare applicants have an incorrect personal identifier, such that 
we cannot match them to their outcomes. For eight applicants information on their 
18 The other benefit schemes include unemployment insurance and disability insurance. We also observe wel-
fare benefits receipt in another municipality. Data on income from self-employment are missing. 
19 An individual can have multiple applications if he/she applies for benefits multiple times within the experi-
mental period. The average number of days elapsed between consecutive applications is 112. 
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caseworker is missing, so we cannot determine under which default option they 
were treated. Furthermore, for 24 applicants, information on the job search period 
is incomplete, and for seven applicants, information on essential controls is missing 
(gender, age, or household situation). In total, we exclude 72 observations from the 
analysis, which leaves us with 2,788 observations (2,640 unique individuals). For 
64 of the 72 excluded observations, we have information on the default option. The 
excluded observations are evenly distributed over the three default options (joint 
p-value is 0.70).
The first column of Table 1 provides information about background characteris-
tics. The majority of the applicants (over 60 percent) are male. The average age in 
the sample is 38.4 years, and the average annual income in the 2 years before the 
welfare application is approximately 13,600 euros. Couples are less likely to qualify 
for welfare, as the income of the partner is taken into account in the means test. In 
our sample, only 11 percent of the applicants have a partner, and 14 percent have 
children. Finally, 28 percent of the applicants have at least a bachelor’s degree.
C. Random Assignment
Our design hinges on the fact that within local welfare offices applicants are ran-
domly allocated to caseworkers, and are, therefore, also randomly assigned to default 
options. The second to fourth columns of Table 1 show the mean characteristics 
of applicants under the default options “normal”, “always”, and “never.” Columns 





Sample Normal Always Never always never never
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 39% 39% 41% 36% 0.29 0.66 0.04
Partner 11% 12% 9% 8% 0.83 0.73 0.58
Children 14% 14% 15% 13% 0.55 0.66 0.83
Age under 30 25% 24% 25% 27% 0.56 0.12 0.36
Age 31–36 25% 23% 28% 27% 0.09 0.20 0.76
Age 37–45 26% 27% 24% 24% 0.19 0.24 0.94
Age above 45 24% 25% 23% 22% 0.35 0.10 0.57
Bachelor/master 28% 27% 28% 31% 0.39 0.65 0.46
Vocational 23% 24% 24% 21% 0.67 0.57 0.65
High school 13% 11% 16% 13% 0.04 0.82 0.02
Prep. vocational 20% 21% 17% 20% 0.02 0.46 0.18
Primary education or less 14% 14% 13% 14% 0.49 0.22 0.48
Education missing 2% 3% 2% 1% 0.22 0.34 0.70
Annual income in previous 13.6 13.5 13.4 14.2 0.67 0.95 0.39
 2 years (×1,000 €)
p-value joint significance 0.14 0.52 0.32
Treatment
Job search period applied 40% 46% 55% 9% 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 2,788 1,657 571 560
Note: The p-values in the last three columns come from regressing each background characteristic on an indicator 
for getting a job search period, controlling for welfare office × three-month period.
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5 to 7 show the p-value of the difference between two groups, for all  different 
 combinations. The characteristics are well balanced over the three  treatment groups. 
There are no systematic differences and for only 6 out of 42 reported characteristics, 
the difference is significantly different from 0. The lower panel in Table 1 shows 
the treatment probability and the number of observations per treatment group. The 
treatment group with the default “normal” is the largest, as this was agreed upon 
with the welfare agency in the research design.
III. Empirical Strategy and Graphical Evidence
A. Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of a job search period on welfare receipt and other income 
variables, we assume a linear relationship. The outcomes of individual  i observed 
t time periods after registering for welfare benefits at time  τ at welfare office  w are 
denoted by  Y iτ tw , and  S P iτ w is an indicator for a job search period. Our regression 
model is specified as
(1)  Y iτ t w =  α τ t w +  δ t S P iτ w +  X i  β t +  u iτ t w .
We estimate this model separately for different elapsed durations  t since applying 
for welfare benefits. The vector  X i contains a set of covariates including age, gender, 
partner status, an indicator for children, cumulative income in the 24 months before 
registration, and dummies for 5 education categories. Each quarter we randomize 
treatments within local offices. Therefore, the regression specification includes 
α τtw , which are fixed effects for the quarter of registration interacted with the local 
welfare office.20 The parameters of interest are  δ t , which describe the effect of a 
job search period  t weeks after registration. Standard errors are clustered at the level 
of caseworker times the quarter of registration.
Job search periods are usually not applied randomly. Under the default option 
“normal” caseworkers target job search periods more to younger workers and those 
without children (see Table A3 in the Appendix). If caseworkers also take unob-
served applicant characteristics into account when imposing a job search period, the 
OLS estimator of  δ t is biased. We exploit our experimental design using two strate-
gies. First, we replace  S P i by the default option of the caseworker that conducted the 
intake meeting of individual  i :
(2)  Y i τ t w =  α τ t w +  δ 1, t Norma l i +  δ 2, t Alway s i +  X i  β t +  u i τ t w .
Because compliance is not perfect,  δ 1 and  δ 2 are the intention-to-treat effects (ITT). 
The advantage of the ITT parameters is that they reflect the change in outcomes if 
the welfare agency moves from abandoning job search periods to the  current policy 
20 Since within local offices applicants are randomly assigned to caseworkers, including local office fixed effects 
and quarter fixed effects without interaction would be sufficient. Indeed, estimation results in such a specification 
are very similar. 
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( δ 1 ), or to a stricter “always” policy ( δ 2 ). However, since the parameters average 
over all applicants (including those that did not receive a job search period), they do 
not reflect the effect of actually imposing a job search period. Therefore, we employ 
a second strategy, where we instrument  S P i with the default option of the caseworker 
that conducted the intake. We estimate a first-stage equation of the form:
(3)  S P iτw =  κ τw +  λ 1 Norma l i +  λ 2 Alway s i +  X i θ +  v iτ w .
In equation (3),  λ 1 and  λ 2 reflect the difference in the probability to receive a 
job search period for caseworkers with the default options “normal” and “always,” 
compared to the default option “never”. We saw before that caseworkers with the 
default option “normal” (“always”) give 37 percentage points (46 percentage points) 
more job search periods than caseworkers with the default option “never”.
Three key assumptions underlie our empirical strategy. First, within local offices, 
the assignment of applicants to default options is unrelated to unobserved character-
istics of the applicant. This assumption is guaranteed by the random assignment of 
applicants to caseworkers in each local office and the random assignment of default 
options to caseworkers in each local office in each quarter. Controlling for local 
office fixed effects and quarter fixed effects is thus crucial. The balancing table pre-
sented earlier confirms the conditional random assignment.
Second, the probability that an individual finds employment (with or without 
a job search period) should not be related to whether other individuals receive a 
job search period (stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)). Our design 
increased the probability for some applicants to receive a job search period, but 
decreased it for others, so approximately the same number of job search periods 
were given as before the experiment started. The treated population in the exper-
iment is only a small fraction of the total population of unemployed workers in 
Amsterdam, which consisted of around 42,000 individuals in 2013. It is unlikely 
that the applied job search periods in our population have substantial spillover or 
general equilibrium effects.
These first two assumptions are required for interpreting the intention-to-treat 
effects. To interpret the instrumental variables estimates, our third assumption is 
monotonicity. No individual would have received a job search period from a case-
worker with default option “never” and would not have received a job search period 
from a caseworker with default option “always.” Under the monotonicity assump-
tion, the instrumental variables estimates are Local Average Treatment Effects 
(LATE) (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). The effect of a job search period is 
only identified for the group of applicants for which the caseworkers complied 
to their default options. Monotonicity likely holds for the same caseworker, but 
within a local welfare office some caseworkers have a higher job search period rate 
under “never” than (other caseworkers) under “normal” or “always.” This may be 
explained by some caseworkers having only very few applicants under a default 
option. In Section VI, we elaborate further on the definition of compliers and the 
interpretation of our estimated effect of a job search period (also when monotonic-
ity does not hold).
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B. Graphical Evidence
Figure 3 presents the fraction of applicants receiving welfare benefits by default 
option. Individuals are counted as receiving benefits in a certain week if payments 
of benefits were made that are assigned to that week. If an applicant returns from a 
job search period and receives benefits retrospectively from the moment of initial 
registration, this person is counted as a benefits recipient from registration onward. 
Take-up of welfare benefits is less than 100 percent for all three default options 
because eligibility for welfare benefits is only determined if the application for ben-
efits is activated.21
Under the default option “never,” the fraction of people receiving welfare bene-
fits is higher than under the default “always.”22 Average benefits receipt under the 
default option “normal” lies in between, but is closer to the default option “always.” 
This suggests that a job search period has a substantial effect on the probability to 
receive welfare benefits. Over time the differences between the three default options 
decrease, but after 26 weeks, applicants under the default option “never” are still 
more likely to receive benefits.
21 Conditioning on welfare benefits entitlement leads to possible confounding effects, as welfare benefits enti-
tlement is not determined for individuals who do not reapply after a job search period. 
22 During the first five weeks the fraction of benefits recipients increases for all three default options. The 
increase is due to individuals that register at the welfare office before the date of exhaustion of UI benefits, leading 
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Figure 3. Fraction of Applicants Receiving Welfare Benefits by Default Option
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IV. Results
A. Welfare Benefits
Figure 4, panel A plots the point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals of 
the intention-to-treat effect on the probability to receive welfare benefits (0/1) esti-
mated separately for each week after registration (following equation (2)). Compared 
to the default option “never,” the default “always” reduces the probability to collect 
some welfare benefits by 10 percentage points, while this is 6 percent for the default 
“normal.” The effects decrease over time, but remain significant even later than 20 
weeks after registration. Table 2 reports the effects of the default options on cumula-
tive outcomes half a year after registration. The first two columns only include con-
trols for calendar time and welfare office, the third and fourth column also control 
for applicant characteristics. As a consequence of the randomization, the estimates 
hardly change when including additional control variables. Applicants in the default 
group “normal” (“always”) receive benefits, on average, 1.80 (2.02) weeks shorter 
than in the default group “never.” This is not a mechanical effect of the job search 
period, as entitlement to benefits starts at the date of initial registration.
We next estimate the effect using our instrumental variables approach. The first-
stage estimates of the default options on the probability to impose a job search period 
are, respectively, 0.35 (s.e. 0.02) for the default “normal” and 0.44 (s.e. 0.03) for 
the default “always.” The F-statistic for joint significance of the instrumental vari-
ables is equal to 237. Figure 4, panel B plots the point estimates of the instrumental 
variables estimates of the probability to receive welfare. A job search period reduces 
welfare benefits receipt by around 20 percentage points in the first 10 weeks. In the 
group with the default option “never,” total take-up of welfare benefits is around 80 
percent, so this implies a reduction of about 25 percent. The effect decreases to 11 
percentage points in week 26, but the effect remains significantly different from 0. 
The first row of Table 2 shows that a job search period reduces the period of receiv-
ing welfare benefits with 4.8 weeks.
A binary variable for receiving welfare benefits does not capture that individuals 
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Figure 4. Probability to Receive Welfare Benefits (colored areas are 90 percent confidence intervals)
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the effect on the amount of welfare benefits received by an applicant. The pattern is 
very similar to Figure 4, panel B. A job search period has a strong effect on welfare 
receipt that is long lasting and only becomes insignificant after 24 weeks. Table 2 
shows that total welfare benefits payments in the first 6 months decrease with 825 
euros, which amounts to a 25 percent reduction of the mean cumulative amount of 
welfare during the first 26 weeks.
B. Earnings, Total Income, and Other Benefits
Not receiving welfare benefits does not necessarily imply employment. A 
job search period can discourage individuals to apply for welfare because of increased 
complexity and higher application costs. Figure 5, panel B shows the effect of the 
job search period on weekly income from employment. A job search period has a 
positive effect on weekly earnings of about 30 euros that becomes significant after 5 
weeks. After 14 weeks, the effect steadily increases to 50 euros. Table 2 shows that 
Table 2—Effect of Job Search Period on Cumulative Outcomes 26 Weeks after Registration
Intention-to-treat Intention-to-treat
IVAlways Normal Always Normal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weeks on welfare −1.89 −1.70 −2.02 −1.80 −4.60 −4.83
(0.73) (0.66) (0.72) (0.66) (1.54) (1.52)
Benefits received (in €) −348 −272 −367 −279 −801 −825
(159) (141) (158) (141) (340) (334)
Earnings (in €) 341 244 392 303 760 887
(219) (203) (223) (199) (473) (469)
Other benefits (in €) −39 −56 −34 −69 −117 −123
(106) (91) (103) (90) (233) (225)
Total income (in €) −46 −84 −8 −45 −157 −61
(196) (192) (198) (182) (436) (423)
Weeks with earnings 0.69 0.33 0.78 0.44 1.35 1.59
 above benefits level (0.45) (0.39) (0.47) (0.39) (0.93) (0.95)
Hours worked 25 15 28 19 52 61
(15) (14) (16) (14) (32) (32)
Hourly wage (in €) 0.69 0.31 0.69 0.29 1.40 1.36
 (conditional on work) (0.60) (0.43) (0.58) (0.43) (1.21) (1.16)
First-stage coefficient 0.34 0.35
 default normal (0.02) (0.02)
First-stage coefficient 0.43 0.44
 default always (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2,788 2,788 2,788 2,788
Included controls:
Appl. characteristics No Yes No Yes
Local office × Calendar Yes Yes Yes Yes
 time fixed effects
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 in each row represent one regression; each cell in columns 5 and 6 
represents a separate regression. The applicant characteristics are age at registration, gender, household composi-
tion, cumulative income in 24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories. Standard errors 
are clustered at the three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to 
the average hourly wage 26 weeks after registration.
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during the first half year after registration a job search period induces individuals to 
earn, on average, 887 euros more. These additional earnings completely compensate 
(108 percent) the forgone welfare benefits of a job search period.23
Welfare is a safety net and applicants should not be entitled to other types of 
benefits. Figure 5, panel C shows that the estimated effect of a job search period on 
income from other benefit schemes (including welfare in other municipalities) is 
small and insignificant. The effect of a job search period on total income (the sum 
of income from welfare, wage, and other benefits) is shown in Figure 5, panel D. 
During the first four weeks the effect on total income is negative and (almost) sig-
nificant. The negative effect during the first four weeks can be caused by individuals 
that find employment during the job search period, and, therefore, never collect any 
welfare benefits. After that, the effect is close to zero and insignificant. The effect 
on cumulative total income is small and not significantly different from zero. This 
23 Our experiment took place during an economic downturn (see Figure B1 in the Appendix). During the second 
half of the experimental period, there was a sharp increase in the inflow into welfare benefits. The estimated effects 
of a job search period are the same for applicants in both time periods. Within this limited time frame, we, therefore, 
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concurs with Markussen and Røed (2016), who find increased job finding of an 
activation program for welfare recipients without increased income.
The increased earnings can be driven by a higher likelihood to be employed, 
more working hours, and/or a higher hourly wage. Table 2 shows that after a job 
search period an individual, on average, experiences 1.59 additional weeks with 
earnings above the benefits level, and total working hours increase with, on average, 
61 hours. These outcomes signal that a job search period mainly increases the like-
lihood to find a full-time job. Conditional on being employed, a job search period 
increases the hourly wage; the effect is quite substantial but insignificant.24 Our 
estimates rule out that liquidity-constrained individuals have to accept lower quality 
jobs quickly. A positive wage effect arises if there is a negative stigma associated 
with actually receiving welfare benefits or if the welfare agency forces individuals 
to accept low-wage jobs.
The absence of an average effect on total income does not rule out that some indi-
viduals may suffer financially from a job search period. Table 3 shows the effects 
of a job search period on different parts of the total income distribution for 8, 16, 
24, and 32 weeks since registration.25 The estimates only show a significant effect 
8 weeks after registration on the likelihood to have a very low income (below 80 
percent of the benefits level). These results show that job search periods do not cause 
persistent income loss.
24 Conditioning on having work can have compositional effects. If a job search period increases employ-
ment, the share of disadvantaged individuals that find work could increase. The estimated wage effect is then an 
underestimate. 
25 In a previous version of the paper, we estimated the marginal distribution of the outcome under different 
treatments for the subpopulation of compliers, following Imbens and Rubin (1997). See Bolhaar, Ketel, and van 
der Klaauw (2016) for details. 
Table 3—Effect of a Job Search Period on Income Distribution at Different Weeks after 
Registration
Weeks since registration
8 weeks 16 weeks 24 weeks 32 weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income  < 80% of benefits level 0.10 0.04 −0.00 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Income  < benefits level −0.00 −0.00 −0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Income  > minimum wage 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income  > 125% of minimum wage 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 2,788 2,788 2,788 2,788
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level.  
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C. Long-Run Effects
The effect of a job search period on benefit receipt becomes insignificant 28 weeks 
after registration. Long-term effects can arise if the type of job is affected by the 
job search period. To investigate such effects we link our data to individual records 
of all Dutch citizens kept by Statistics Netherlands. The records are less detailed 
than the data used above, but they follow individuals until December 2014 (at least 
91 weeks after registration).26
Table 4 presents the instrumental variable estimates for 52, 78, and 91 weeks after 
registration. The long-term effects are estimated less precisely than the effects after 
26 weeks, but, if anything, the effect of the job search period increases rather than 
decreases over time. The reductions in welfare benefits payments are, therefore, 
permanent savings, that are not offset by a later increase in benefit dependency. One 
year after registration the hourly wage is 21 percent higher if a job search period 
is applied. Again, no empirical evidence is found that a job search period induces 
applicants to accept lower quality jobs.
26 Statistics Netherlands provides monthly earnings information instead of weekly and the data do not contain 
working hours. Furthermore, the classification of benefits types is less detailed. 
Table 4—Effect of a Job Search Period on Cumulative Long-Run Outcomes
Weeks since registration
52 weeks 78 weeks 91 weeks
(1) (2) (3)
Weeks on welfare −4.14 −5.43 −6.38
(2.69) (3.74) (4.32)
Benefits received (in €) −956 −1219 −1,475
(656) (927) (1,069)
Earnings (in €) 839 1214 1,424
(1,027) (1,666) (2,027)
Other benefits (in €) −415 −681 −558
(361) (493) (559)
Total income (in €) −607 −829 −792
(813) (1,353) (1,658)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 0.73 1.09 1.15
(0.63) (0.99) (1.17)
Hourly wage (conditional on work) 1.84 NA NA
(0.81)
Observations 2,788 2,788 2,788
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level. All regressions are based on information from Statistics Netherlands except 
for hourly wage, which is based on information from the social insurance administration. Hourly wage is not a 
cumulative outcome; it refers to the average hourly wage 52 weeks after registration.
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V. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
A. Degree of Vulnerability
A job search period has, on average, positive effects on labor market outcomes, 
but there can be subgroups of the population suffering from a job search period. 
To capture such heterogeneity in the effect, we create a vulnerability index to rank 
applicants. We sum the presence of eight risk factors: no wage income in the two 
years before registration, positive income from welfare benefits in the two years 
before registration, older than 45 years, financial problems, children, low education, 
low self-reliance, and no favorable expectation of caseworker on job finding. We 
divide the sample in four groups with zero, one, two, or more than two risk factors 
present.27
Table 5 shows that the effect of a job search period is largest for the least vulner-
able applicants and declines monotonically with the degree of vulnerability.28 The 
point estimate of −11.02 implies a 86 percent decrease in the number of weeks on 
welfare for the least vulnerable applicants. For the two most vulnerable groups (col-
umns 3 and 4), the effects are much smaller and not significant. There is no signifi-
cant effect on total income for any of the groups. The lowest panel of Table 6 reports 
the first stages. For all groups the default option “normal” substantially increases the 
rate at which job search periods are applied with only limited variation between the 
groups. Under the default option “always,” the rate of applying job search periods 
to the least vulnerable group only increases to 0.65. The heterogeneity of treat-
ment effects is in agreement with the policy of the welfare agency to avoid applying 
job search periods to the most vulnerable applicants. We should also conclude that 
caseworkers are not targeting job search periods very effectively.
Above we reported that a job search period increases the likelihood to have very 
low income in the first few weeks after registration. This negative effect is present 
only for the least vulnerable group (see Table A6 in the Appendix). Again this effect 
is only short-lived, and 24 weeks after registration the least vulnerable group has an 
increased probability to earn more than 125 percent of the minimum wage.29
27 Self-reliance and the caseworker’s expectation on job finding are taken from the forms that the caseworkers 
filled in (for 72 percent of the observations). Presence of the form is neither related to the default option nor to any 
of the outcome variables. 
28 Table A4 in the Appendix is based on an alternative vulnerability index that ranks individuals based on the 
first component of a Principal Component Analysis using a rich set of pre-experiment covariates. This approach 
gives very similar results. Table A5 reports effects by level of education, with results very similar to the results by 
level of vulnerability. In none of the approaches do we find evidence for negative effects of a job search period on 
a specific group. 
29 We test for heterogeneity of the effect of a job search period by duration of the search period and previous 
welfare receipt. A job search period can be at most four weeks, but caseworkers have some discretion in determin-
ing the duration. We do not find significantly different effects by duration of the job search period. The effect of a 
job search period is larger for first-time applicants, but it is not absent for returning applicants, implying that a job 
search period does not only deter first-time applicants. 
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B. Crime and Health
Even though we do not find negative effects on labor market outcomes, a job search 
period causes uncertainty and maybe (financial) stress. Health problems and crime 
can be the result of such stress. Statistics Netherlands provides administrative data 
on suspects of crime30 and annual health-care costs covered by the (mandatory) 
basic health insurance. Crime and health are measured at a yearly basis, so we 
aggregate outcomes for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014.31
Crime and health outcomes need not necessarily worsen due to a job search 
period. A job search period increases job finding and work is usually associated 
with reduced crime and better health outcomes. One may expect that job finding 
30 In the Netherlands, on average, 90 percent of the registered suspects are declared guilty (CBS, WODC, and 
Raad voor de Rechtspraak 2014) 
31 This means that for some individuals the crime/health expense can take place before the job search period. 
Given the randomized design, there is no reason to suspect a difference in crime and health outcomes before the 
start of the experiment. We repeat the analysis by period of registration, and only 2013 outcomes, which gives very 
similar results. 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare −11.02 −6.57 −2.43 0.46
(2.20) (2.24) (2.63) (2.81)
Benefits received (in €) −1,946 −1,277 −340 207
(468) (544) (626) (687)
Earnings (in €) 2,652 993 256 75
(1,059) (948) (993) (634)
Other benefits (in €) 279 −105 171 −471
(408) (348) (476) (456)
Total income (in €) 985 −389 87 −188
(992) (918) (930) (755)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 4.60 2.39 0.69 −0.02
(1.96) (1.85) (1.96) (1.35)
Hours worked 125 85 53 8
(68) (63) (74) (48)
Hourly wage (in €) (conditional on work) 2.23 0.06 2.58 1.82
(2.26) (1.81) (4.30) (1.90)
First-stage coefficient default normal 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
First-stage coefficient default always 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.37
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Percent of job search periods under default never 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.05
Observations 462 680 679 967
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average hourly 
wage 26 weeks after registration.
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dominates for the least vulnerable groups and stress for the most vulnerable groups. 
Table 6 reports the estimated effects for the different groups.32 We do not find any 
support for detrimental effects of a job search period on health or crime for the most 
vulnerable applicants. We also do not find very strong evidence that the increased 
job finding improves health and reduces crime. Only for the second group there is 
a negative effect on property crime and reduced mental health care expenditures.
A job search period is a bundle of treatments. First, it delays benefits payments, 
which may cause liquidity constraints and financial stress. Our results do not indi-
cate that the delayed benefits payments have harmful effects. Labor market, health, 
and crime outcomes of the most vulnerable individuals remain unaffected, while it 
is not the case that the least vulnerable individuals have accepted very low-wage 
jobs. Second, applicants have to make many job applications, but can decide them-
selves where to apply. The most vulnerable individuals likely apply to the same 
(low-skilled) jobs during the job search period as when they are collecting benefits. 
For this group we do not find increased job finding, which indicates that for them 
the increased job search is not effective. For the least vulnerable workers, we find 
increased job finding and wages seem somewhat higher. This suggests that discre-
tion in job applications is for the least vulnerable individuals an important element 
in the job search period.
32 The health and crime outcomes for the full sample are reported in Table A7 in the Appendix. 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total crime 0.07 0.14 0.03 −0.20
(0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Property crime 0.08 −0.11 0.02 −0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Total health expenditures −1,275 −2,362 −783 1,877
(1,730) (1,700) (2,061) (1,756)
GP expenditures −76 −36 31 −7
(44) (36) (42) (36)
Physical health expenditures −1075 449 −142 299
(1,286) (685) (963) (1,478)
Mental health care expenditures −224 −2,813 828 915
(1,110) (1,214) (1,224) (954)
Observations 444 684 707 953
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). The regressions on crime include a dummy 
for being suspect of a crime from 2008–2011 and the regressions for health include health expenditures in the rele-
vant category for the years 2009–2011. Standard errors are clustered at the three-month period × caseworker level.
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VI. Interpretation
The estimated effect of a job search period should be interpreted as a local aver-
age treatment effect. Caseworkers decide about imposing a job search period and 
that decision depends on the randomly assigned default options. In this section, we 
provide some interpretation of the estimated local average treatment effect and test 
if the effect changes when we consider other groups of compliers. The latter is infor-
mative about how well caseworkers target job search periods.
Suppose it is possible to rank applicants according to an (unobserved) index that 
we refer to as the propensity not to receive a job search period. Applicants that are 
always given a job search period have propensity zero and applicants with a pro-
pensity of one never receive a job search period. If we assume that there is no het-
erogeneity among caseworkers when executing the three default options, the default 
options can be translated into thresholds. Under the default option “never,” job 
search periods are only assigned to applicants with a propensity less than 0.09 and 
these applicants are the always takers. Under the default option “always,” all appli-
cants with a propensity less than 0.55 are assigned a job search period. Therefore, 
applicants with a propensity above 0.55 are the never takers and those with a pro-
pensity between 0.09 and 0.55 are compliers. The default option “normal” splits the 
compliers in two groups. First are applicants with a propensity between 0.09 and 
0.46, who comply to both the default option “normal” and “always.” And second are 
applicants with a propensity between 0.46 and 0.55, who only comply to the default 
option “always.” Overidentification tests in the Appendix do not provide evidence 
that treatment effects differ between compliers to the default options “normal” and 
“always” (see Table A8). The power of this approach is not very high since the rates 
at which job search periods are imposed under the default option “normal” and 
“always” do not differ very much.
We next consider the individual compliance of each caseworker. Figure 6, panel A 
shows for each caseworker the rate of job search periods imposed under the default 
options “normal” and “never.” Each circle represents a caseworker, and the size of 
the circle describes the number of applicants a caseworker has under the default 
option “normal.”33 There is substantial variation in the rate at which caseworkers 
assign job search periods under the default option “normal.” Most caseworkers 
who normally assign many job search periods, substantially reduce this if they are 
assigned the default option “never.” However, there are a few caseworkers who do 
not change behavior under the default option “never,” and impose job search periods 
as often as under the default option “normal”.34
Figure 6, panel B shows the same figure, but now comparing the default option 
“always” with the default option “normal.” The figure is less pronounced than the 
previous figure. Obviously, many caseworkers find it difficult to impose job search 
33 There are many caseworkers with only few applicants. Exploiting differences in rates at which caseworkers 
assign job search periods under the different default options (e.g., Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013) would incor-
porate too much noise. 
34 That compliance to a randomized treatment assignment differs between caseworkers is not uncommon. 
Sherman and Berk (1984) finds that about half of the police officers selected for participation in their field experi-
ment never hand in cases. 
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periods more often than usually. There are also some caseworkers who normally 
already impose job search periods so often that this can hardly be increased. Finally, 
there are some caseworkers who more or less refuse to give job search periods. Even 
under the default option “always” they (almost) never apply job search periods.35
Because within local offices applicants are randomly assigned to caseworkers, 
we can restrict our sample to caseworkers with substantial compliance rates without 
harming the randomization. In Table 7, we proceed in three steps and remove appli-
cants of caseworkers who do not comply with the following rules:
 (i) Fraction “never” < 20 percent and fraction “always” > 40 percent.
 (ii) Fraction “never” < 10 percent and fraction “always” > 40 percent.
 (iii) Fraction “never” < 10 percent and fraction “always” > 60 percent.
We only remove observations if a caseworker had more than five applicants in the 
relevant default options, to not run the risk of removing caseworkers that had a very 
peculiar draw of applicants. A regression of an indicator for the different samples 
that remain under these selection criteria shows that there are no observable differ-
ences between applicants in the different groups (see Table A9 in the Appendix). 
Table 7 presents the estimated effects of a job search period for the different subsam-
ples. At the bottom of the table we see that by removing noncomplying caseworkers, 
the first-stage coefficients increase. In the most strictly defined sample (column 4) 
35 In Figure 6, panels A and B, some caseworkers are actually defiers, applying more (less) job search periods 
under the default never (always) than under the default normal. Of the eight caseworkers that apply more job search 
periods under the default never than under normal, this difference is significant (at a 10 percent significance level) 
for one caseworker. Of the 23 caseworkers that apply less job search periods under always than under normal, the 
difference is significant for three caseworkers. 
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the estimates now cover propensities from 0.06 to 0.71 percent. There is no evidence 
that the effect of a job search period decreases with the propensity not to apply a job 
search period. The effect on earnings even becomes slightly larger.36
The results in Table 7 also show that the local average treatment effects are not 
sensitive to changes in the sample and the group of compliers. Obviously, case-
workers do not succeed in targeting job search periods to those applicants for 
which the effects are largest. These findings justify the assumptions presented by 
de Chaisemartin (2017) to interpret instrumental variable estimates as causal effects 
in the presence of defiers.37 The formal interpretation is that we estimate the aver-
age treatment effect for the surviving compliers. However, the  robustness of the 
36 This test is potentially not very powerful, as the sample that is excluded contributes little to the identification 
of the local average treatment effect. 
37 de Chaisemartin (2017) introduces the complier-defier assumption, which states that a group of compliers 
can be found which has the same size as the defiers and the same average treatment effect. He discusses how this 
assumption may hold in applications of judges and examiners. Our setting of caseworkers has strong similarities 
except that our experiment exogenously changes default options of caseworkers, which provides insight in which 
caseworkers are defiers. Our results are robust to excluding these caseworkers, which supports the complier-defier 
assumption and maybe even the stronger assumption that compliers and defiers have equal average treatment effects 
(e.g., Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). 
Table 7—Outcomes for Different Groups of Compliers
Total 
sample
Never < 20% 
Always > 40%
Never < 10% 
Always > 40%
Never < 10% 
Always > 60%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare −4.83 −4.24 −4.68 −5.22
(1.52) (1.48) (1.55) (1.92)
Benefits received (in €) −825 −666 −769 −754
(334) (318) (336) (393)
Earnings (in €) 887 789 900 1498
(469) (449) (469) (579)
Other benefits (in €) −123 −106 −74 −142
(225) (198) (211) (267)
Total income (in €) −61 17 57 602
(423) (404) (401) (484)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 1.59 1.52 1.76 3.05
(0.95) (0.92) (0.96) (1.17)
Hours worked 61 51 56 87
(32) (31) (33) (42)
Hourly wage (in €) (conditional on work) 1.36 1.55 0.75 1.50
(1.16) (1.16) (0.97) (1.16)
First-stage default normal 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
First-stage default always 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.59
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2,788 2,373 2,207 1,603
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average hourly 
wage 26 weeks after registration.
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 estimated coefficients suggests that the estimated local average treatment is general-
izable to a larger share of the sample.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a field experiment, in combination with detailed adminis-
trative data, to study mandatory job search periods for new applicants of welfare 
benefits. Our empirical results provide evidence for a strong and persistent effect 
of a job search period on receipt of welfare benefits. Six months after applying 
for welfare, the total benefits payments are reduced by, on average, 25 percent. 
The reduced welfare benefits are fully compensated (108 percent) by increased 
income from employment and there are no spillovers to other benefit schemes. 
A job search period is most effective for the least vulnerable applicants, for this 
group the likelihood to receive benefits decreases with 86 percent.
The job search period causes uncertainty concerning eligibility to wel-
fare benefits and delays the first benefits payment by about 15 days. This may 
induce welfare benefits applicants to increase job search effort. The latter is also 
required by the job search requirements associated to the job search period. The 
ex post monitoring of compliance to the job search requirement is limited, but 
welfare benefits applicants are unaware of this. In addition, the job search period 
increases the complexity of the benefits application. Our results suggest that the 
increased complexity of the application process does not hurt the most vulnerable 
applicants. In particular, we do not find evidence of negative side effects, such 
as engagement in criminal behavior or an increase in health expenditures. Our 
preferred conclusion is that increased job finding is the main mechanism through 
which job search periods affect individual outcomes. There is no evidence that a 
job search period induces individuals to accept lower-wage jobs. Therefore, the 
job search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare benefits to those 
people who need it most.
The job search requirement and the waiting period are easily transferable to 
other situations, which suggests that job search periods can be useful policy instru-
ments for unemployment insurance and disability insurance. The administrative 
costs of imposing a job search period are small and it is an early intervention that 
can prevent more costly interventions later during the period of benefits depen-
dency. However, the population in our experiment has two important features. 
First, they do not have serious limitations to work. Second, applicants have very 
limited financial resources, which is a condition for entitlement to welfare bene-
fits. These aspects of the applicant population might be essential for a successful 
implementation of a job search period in other settings. Currently only a small 
share of all benefits recipients are exposed to a job search period at the same time. 
Expanding job search periods to other groups may reduce the effectiveness due to 
congestion effects in job search.
Randomized experiments with welfare applicants are still rare. We show that 
with an encouragement design, which allowed for opting out in special cases, 
it is possible to evaluate (existing) policies for welfare applicants. The opt-out 
possibility has been important to obtain support of caseworkers, which ensured 
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sufficient compliance to our randomization. Finally, the design of our experiment 
allowed us to also study whether caseworkers are able to target job search periods 
to those clients for whom they are most effective. We find that this is not the case; a 
job search period is effective for a larger share of the applicants than the population 
on which caseworkers normally impose a job search period. Our results suggest 
that the welfare administration should instruct the caseworkers to apply job search 
periods more frequently.
Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A1—Benefit Levels (net, in € per month)
Housing costs
Full Shared
Single without children 935.80 802.12
Single with children 1,203.19 1,069.50
Couple without children 1,336.87 1,203.19
Couple with children 1,336.87 1,203.19
Notes: Benefit levels in period July 1 to December 31 in 2012, net including holiday allowance. 
Benefit levels outside this time frame differ only marginally. Shared housing costs apply if the 
costs are shared with an individual that is not the partner or child.
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Table A2—Characteristics of Applicants for Welfare Benefits by Class
Class
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Panel A. Personal characteristics
Female 53% 46% 33% 40%
Age at application (in years) 39.6 38.6 36.6 35.6
Single 77% 74% 78% 82%
Single parent 8% 8% 9% 8%
Couple, no children 9% 8% 6% 5%
Couple, with children 7% 10% 7% 5%
Welfare in last 4 years 37% 41% 38% 29%
Panel B. Education
Bachelor/master 13% 10% 11% 30%
Vocational 21% 18% 28% 32%
High school 9% 7% 9% 9%
Preparatory vocational 28% 26% 32% 19%
Primary or less 19% 27% 14% 8%
Education unknown 10% 12% 6% 3%
Panel C. Reason application for welfare
Lost job 4% 4% 5% 13%
End of self-employment 4% 4% 4% 7%
End unemployment insurance benefits 6% 8% 18% 26%
End of other source of income 21% 23% 31% 41%
Split with partner 8% 6% 4% 1%
End of incarceration 2% 3% 2% 0%
End of study 3% 1% 2% 4%
Inflow for other reasons 59% 59% 52% 33%
Panel D. Barriers to entry on the labor market
Physical problems 49% 30% 28% 25%
Psychological problems 51% 31% 20% 16%
Addiction 11% 13% 7% 3%
Language 17% 32% 18% 16%
Financial situation 31% 35% 44% 48%
Criminal history 11% 17% 20% 9%
Living situation 18% 27% 18% 10%
Observations 4,014 5,726 4,334 9,517
Notes: Statistics are based on applications for welfare benefits from January 1, 2012 until April 
25, 2014. Information on barriers to entry in the labor market is only available for 14,534 of 
the observations.
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Table A3—Targeting Job Search Periods by Caseworkers under Default “Normal”
Job search period p-value 
differentialNo Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Female 40% 37% 0.19
Partner 13% 11% 0.03
Children 16% 11% 0.00
Age under 30 20% 30% 0.00
Age 31–36 21% 26% 0.01
Age 37–45 30% 23% 0.00
Age above 45 29% 21% 0.00
Bachelor/master 26% 27% 0.08
Vocational 24% 24% 0.82
High school 13% 9% 0.01
Preparatory vocational 22% 20% 0.25
Primary education or less 13% 15% 0.84
Education missing 1% 5% 0.00
Annual income in previous two years (×1,000 €) 13.7 13.3 0.43
Observations 899 758
Note: The p-values in the last three columns come from regressing each background char-
acteristic on an indicator for getting a job search period, controlling for welfare office 
× three-month period.
Table A4—Effect of Job Search Period 26 Weeks after Initial Registration by Degree of 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare −9.38 −7.46 −1.97 2.18
(2.74) (2.11) (2.03) (3.23)
Benefits received (in €) −1,950 −921 −833 528
(572) (505) (450) (764)
Earnings (in €) 3,003 796 574 −750
(1,336) (1,020) (591) (653)
Other benefits (in €) −350 361 −469 −137
(496) (302) (399) (498)
Total income (in €) 704 236 −728 −360
(1,222) (937) (609) (809)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 5.07 2.73 0.25 −1.88
(2.47) (1.81) (1.33) (1.43)
Hours worked 162 63 42 −23
(81) (60) (48) (52)
Hourly wage (in €) (conditional on work) 4.31 0.02 −0.09 −0.55
(2.11) (2.12) (2.14) (1.61)
First-stage coefficient default normal 0.30 0.40 0.29 0.34
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
First-stage coefficient default always 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.39
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Percent of job search periods under default never 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.04
Observations 697 697 697 697
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average hourly 
wage 26 weeks after registration.
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Weeks on welfare −2.45 −4.31 −7.97
(2.52) (2.17) (2.26)
Benefits received (in €) −264 −810 −1,486
(578) (499) (480)
Earnings (in €) 526 1,093 1032
(720) (690) (940)
Other benefits (in €) −285 −39 −66
(375) (323) (355)
Total income (in €) −23 244 −519
(593) (670) (895)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 0.72 2.31 1.52
(1.52) (1.43) (1.63)
Hours worked 33 97 46
(58) (47) (58)
Hourly wage (in €) (conditional on work) −0.66 1.72 2.92
(1.44) (1.55) (2.09)
Observations 1,011 1,007 770
Notes: Each row in this table represents one regression including interactions for the differ-
ent subgroups. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and control 
for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, and cumula-
tive income in 24 months before registration). Standard errors are clustered at the three-month 
period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average 
hourly wage 26 weeks after registration.
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Table A6—Effect of a Job Search Period on Income Distribution at Different Weeks after 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
8 weeks after registration
Income  < 80% of benefits level 0.32 0.16 0.07 −0.13
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Income  < benefits level 0.09 0.04 −0.19 0.06
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Income  > minimum wage 0.04 0.11 0.04 −0.10
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Income  > 125% of minimum wage 0.06 0.05 0.05 −0.06
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
24 weeks after registration
Income  < 80% of benefits level 0.03 0.03 0.00 −0.12
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
Income  < benefits level −0.15 −0.04 −0.12 0.05
(0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
Income  > minimum wage 0.29 0.16 −0.08 −0.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09)
Income  > 125% of minimum wage 0.26 0.23 −0.05 −0.11
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07)
Observations 462 680 679 967
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time fixed effects and 
control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 
24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the 
three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average hourly 
wage 26 weeks after registration.  
Table A7—Effect of a Job Search Period on Crime and Health Outcomes
Included years of outcome variable
2012, 2013 2012, 2013, 2014
(1) (2)
Total crime 0.00 −0.01
(0.04) (0.05)
Property crime −0.01 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Total health expenditures −312 −366
(796) (972)
GP expenditures −17 26
(14) (−18)
Physical health expenditures 167 175
(502) (591)
Mental health care expenditures −256 −344
(419) (529)
Observations 2,788 2,788
Notes: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time 
fixed effects and control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household 
composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 educa-
tion categories). The regressions on crime include a dummy for being suspect of a crime from 
2008–2011 and the regressions for health include health expenditures in the relevant category 
for the years 2009–2011. Standard errors are clustered at the three-month period × caseworker 
level. All regressions are based on information from Statistics Netherlands.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare −4.83 0.72 −5.50 −2.95
(1.52) (1.92) (8.02)
Benefits received (in €) −825 0.89 −801 −1,099
(334) (420) (1,751)
Earnings (in €) 887 0.95 941 1,406
(469) (587) (2,596)
Other benefits (in €) −123 0.59 −261 92
(225) (271) (1,019)
Total income (in €) −61 0.82 −121 400
(423) (554) (2,309)
Weeks with earnings above benefits level 1.59 0.58 1.48 5.34
(0.95) (1.12) (5.92)
Hours worked 61 0.77 65 143
(32) (40) (196)
Hourly wage (in €) (conditional on work) 1.36 0.55 0.63 4.03
(1.16) (1.27) (4.43)
First-stage coefficient default normal 0.35 0.34
(0.02) (0.02)
First-stage coefficient default always 0.44 0.08
(0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2,788 2,217 2,228
Notes: In columns 1, 3, and 4, each cell represents one equation. All regressions include local office × calendar time 
fixed effects and control for applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumula-
tive income in 24 months before registration, and dummies for 5 education categories). Standard errors are clustered 
at the three-month period × caseworker level. Hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome; it refers to the average 
hourly wage 26 weeks after registration.
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Table A9—Characteristics of Different Groups of Compliers
Never < 20% 
Always > 40%
Never < 10% 
Always > 40%
Never < 10% 
Always > 60%
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Partner 0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Children 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 31–36 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 37–45 −0.01 −0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age above 45 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bachelor/master −0.04 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vocational −0.03 −0.00 −0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
High school 0.02 0.04 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Preparatory vocational 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Education missing 0.02 −0.05 −0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
Income 2 years before (× 1,000 €) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Location: Southeast 0.08 0.25 −0.32
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Location: North 0.03 0.12 0.19
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Location: Centrum/East 0.02 0.19 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Location: New West −0.01 0.17 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Quarter 2 0.02 −0.00 −0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Quarter 3 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Quarter 4 −0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
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Figure B1. Inflow and Outflow of Welfare between 2008 and 2014 and Macroeconomic Indicators
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